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To understand the socially rooted measures in disaster
management and reconstruction, we studied Indone-
sia as a model from the perspective of social flux, by in-
corporating the latest knowledge in this field. Charac-
teristically, in Indonesian society, people move so fre-
quently that it is difficult for information or knowledge
to accumulate; their living and occupational forms are
constantly in flux. Because of these characteristics,
supporters and local residents of Indonesia have de-
vised a variety of measures for effective disaster man-
agement, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruc-
tion. However, such measures have often not been
positively evaluated – they have been viewed as an
immature response of Indonesian society. In this pa-
per, we have positively reviewed the various measures
taken in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004,
the Java earthquake of 2006, and the West Sumatra
Earthquake of 2009 in order to construct an Indone-
sian model of disaster management and reconstruc-
tion from the perspective of social flux. We hope the
proposed model will also prove effective in many other
parts of the world.
Keywords: information, technology transfer, emergency
humanitarian assistance, area studies, social flux
1. Preface
1.1. Social Aspects of Disaster Management and
Reconstruction
Disasters have often been addressed in the context of
prevention and reconstruction. In post – World War II
Japan, people first paid attention to the reconstruction
of the war-devastated country. Then, pollution problems
were addressed. Currently, we have started focusing on
disasters and security problems, which include terrorism.
People are also concerned about infectious diseases such
as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and avian
flu.1
1. For the history of disaster management studies in Japan, refer to Refer-
ence [1].
As far as natural disasters are concerned, people’s in-
terest is shifting from “disaster prevention” to “disaster
mitigation” in the hope of reducing disasters as much
as possible. People are beginning to realize that com-
pletely preventing physical damage might not be feasible
because advances in quake-resistant engineering will not
make buildings entirely earthquake proof. Social aspect
plays an important role in disaster mitigation. Therefore,
we need to obtain resources from other disciplines such
as human and social sciences. Conventional disaster man-
agement studies in Japan have been focusing on support
from public organizations and residents’ groups.2 Nowa-
days, non-experts in disaster management, including vol-
unteers, participate in operations at disaster sites, and they
are expected to play important roles. More studies are
needed to effectively deal with the reconstruction of dev-
astated areas and the rehabilitation of victims, keeping in
mind the diversity of affected societies and the overall im-
pact on society.3
Area studies in Japan have rarely paid attention to dis-
aster management. However, in the wake of the Indian
Ocean tsunami in 2004, more attention is being paid to
the process of disaster management in the affected areas
around the Indian Ocean. Studies are also being con-
ducted in the areas of disaster management and human-
itarian assistance.4 This paper is based on the accumu-
lated studies on disasters. We discuss how information
and technology should be conveyed in a society in which
international relief agencies play important roles in dis-
aster management, humanitarian support, and reconstruc-
tion. Here, disaster science, information, and technology
are introduced by external agencies. This paper addresses
specific cases in Indonesia in the hope that these cases will
serve as a model for other countries and regions.
2. Refer to Reference [2] for disaster management in modern Japan and to
Reference [3] for disaster management in pre-modern Japan.
3. Some examples of such studies include References [4, 5]. Reference [6]
attempts to regrasp the conventional concepts of disaster management
based on actual experiences at disaster sites.
4. Reference [7] presents the on-site investigations by area studies re-
searchers of the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. Reference [8] is the
only work that deals with disaster damage and reconstruction in the local
context in area studies in Japan before 2004. For grasping disaster man-
agement from the anthropological perspective, refer to Reference [9].
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1.2. Information and Technology in Disaster Man-
agement and Reconstruction
We might think that if correct information and tech-
nology were given to people, they would respond appro-
priately in disaster management, humanitarian assistance,
and reconstruction. However, people sometimes do not
respond appropriately even when correct information and
required technology are provided.5
One school of thought premised that universal infor-
mation and technology is always available. They believe
that the above-mentioned inappropriate responses were
caused because information and technology were not al-
ways introduced in their original forms to individuals.
Such problems could be resolved by developing social in-
frastructures to facilitate people’s access to correct infor-
mation and technology.6
Another school of thought asserts that information
and technology are different realities to different people;
therefore, it is important to “translate” information and
technology to suit individual situations. The role of in-
termediaries who understand universal information and
technology as well as local contexts is important for such
“translations.”
Local counterparts could act as intermediaries, as seen
in the field of developmental assistance and technology
transfer.7 However, local counterparts are often obliged
to accept a subordinate position to external supporters
and engineers who provide information and technology
to the area. It is essential, therefore, to review the role of
intermediaries in developmental assistance and technol-
ogy transfer and define their roles more positively.8 Local
counterparts, who understand both the universal and the
local contexts, can “translate” information and technol-
ogy in forms appropriate to the local situations.
This paper discusses the various aspects of “transla-
tion” of information and technology in disaster manage-
ment, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction in In-
donesia. It is based on two features of Indonesian society
pointed out in the area studies: high social flux9 and large
socio-cultural diversity.
The concept of social flux has not been studied enough
in disaster management and humanitarian assistance in In-
5. Japan Meteorological Agency issued large-scale tsunami warnings to
Aomori, Iwate, and Miyagi Prefectures. It also issued similar tsunami
warnings to other regions in Japan where local governments issued evac-
uation directives or calls to local coastal residents when the Chilean
earthquake and tsunami occurred in February 2010. According to the
Fire and Disaster Management Agency of Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications, the evacuation rate of local residents was 6.5%
in the regions where evacuation directives were issued and 2.6% in the
regions where evacuation calls were issued.
6. Developing social infrastructures will help avoiding circulation of ru-
mors by providing authorized information. For information and rumors,
refer to Reference [10].
7. Reference [11] gives the general picture of mainstreaming of participa-
tory development processes in the field of developmental assistance.
8. Reference [12] attempts to perceive the processes of localization by
which universal values as represented by the modern world system are
accepted by local communities. Reference [13] describes the relation-
ships between assistance givers and assistance receivers where assistance
receivers consciously interpret the intentions of assistance givers.
9. High social flux, described in detail in the following section, not only
refers to vertical and horizontal movements of people between different
social levels but also to the fact that a large percentage of society mem-
bers have flexibility in the forms of residences, occupations, or commu-
nities.
donesia. We first describe the various issues involved in
the conventional ways of disaster management and hu-
manitarian assistance. In particular, we discuss the is-
sues involved in the distribution of aid and the sharing
of knowledge for disaster management. Then, we dis-
cuss how disaster management and humanitarian assis-
tance should be pursued by taking the concept of social
flux into consideration.10
1.3. Social Flux in Southeast Asia
A high social flux generally indicates frequent move-
ments of people or frequent changes in the membership
of a society and fluidity in the roles played by its mem-
bers. Southeast Asian societies – particularly Indonesia –
are known as societies with high social flux.
In Southeast Asia, which is traditionally characterized
by small populations, political power has been linked
to the control of access to goods or information.11 In
pre-modern Southeast Asia, rivers were the major trans-
portation routes.12 Therefore, those who controlled the
ports seized political power.13 Port polities could not com-
pletely control the inland areas that yielded commodities,
such as rice, gold, and forest products. There were vast
unexplored inland areas. When people became uncom-
fortable with the rulers of port polities, they moved to
other areas. It was geopolitically too difficult to tightly
control people’s movements and prevent them from mov-
ing out to other areas in port polities.14
It is a traditional practice in Southeast Asia for adult
men to leave their birthplaces and to live in other lands.15
The Minangkabau people in West Sumatra, Indonesia,
are well known for their practice of merantau (i.e., go-
ing abroad or away from one’s birthplace). In the Mi-
nangkabau society, the women own and inherit real estate,
and men leave their birthplaces to live in other areas.16 In
the 1970s, the Indonesian government launched a national
policy of transmigration, which aimed to move the labor
force from the crowded Java Island to the less crowded
Sumatra Island and other Indonesian islands.17 Provin-
cial demographic statistics show that almost every local
city has a mixture of ethnic groups from other areas in
Indonesia.18 The range of merantau is not limited to the
10. For review on disaster management and humanitarian assistance in In-
donesia from the viewpoint of area studies, refer to “Disasters and Area
Studies” in Issue No.2 of Volume 11 of the Journal “Area Studies”
(Showado, 2011).
11. For less-populated societies in Southeast Asia, refer to Reference [14].
12. Refer to Reference [15]. Such political powers include Ayutthaya King-
dom in Thailand and Aceh Kingdom in Sumatra.
13. For port polities, refer to References [16] and [17].
14. For the difficulties the Western powers experienced with border control
in the colonization of the Southeast Asia, refer to Reference [18].
15. Such practices are seen in many regions in Sumatra. Among such re-
gions, the West Sumatra province is traditionally known as the area
where men move out.
16. The merantau practice of the Minangkabau people is briefly summarized
in References [19] and [20].
17. Immigration policies date back to the Dutch colonial period. For the
overview and social impacts of the immigration policies including the
Dutch colonial period, refer to References [21, 22].
18. For example, the ratios of the Javanese in the provincial populations of
Sumatra Island are as follows: 15.9% in Aceh; 32.6% in North Sumatra;
4% in West Sumatra; 25.1% in Riau; 27.6% in Jambi; 27.0% in South
Sumatra; 22.3% in Bengkulu; 61.9% in Lampung; and 5.8% in Bangka
Belitung [22].
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domestic areas of Indonesia because an increasing num-
ber of laborers are going abroad to work as housemaids or
construction workers.
The extension and reconstruction of buildings is very
popular, and owners prefer to do this work themselves
rather than leave it to professional contractors.19 Such
buildings often do not have quake-resistant designs.20
In Indonesia, people often change their form of accom-
modation as well as occupation; they prefer not to stay in
the same job for too long.
In societies having high social flux, knowledge or ex-
periences are not easily shared and accumulated by all the
members of the society. This is not because there is lim-
ited access to correct information but because every mem-
ber of the society has a different reality. We reviewed the
processes for disaster management, humanitarian assis-
tance, and reconstruction in Indonesia based on the above
assumptions.21
2. Role of Posko in Emergency Humanitarian
Assistance
In communities where knowledge and experiences are
not collected from the grassroots level and not passed
down from the top, each unit of society sets up posts to
share information with other units. Such posts are called
poskos in Indonesia.
In this section, we report our investigation results in-
cluding the findings of the field surveys in Aceh. To inves-
tigate the reconstruction process, we visited Banda Aceh
City over many months: February, August, and Decem-
ber (2005); September and December (2006); February,
September, and December (2007); January, August, and
December (2008); February, August, and October (2009);
and August (2011). We interviewed local residents and
the staff of government organizations and NGOs.
2.1. Posko
In the wake of large-scale natural disasters, relief orga-
nizations tried to ensure the efficient delivery of limited
relief goods without any overlapping. Governmental and
international organizations provided assistance by divid-
ing the affected areas sectorwise into distinct administra-
tive units.
Disaster victims are evacuated to places within and be-
yond the administrative boundaries, whereas relief and
rehabilitation assistance is given along administrative
boundaries. The disaster victims who are evacuated out-
side their original residences might not be able to receive
19. For extension or reconstruction of buildings in Indonesia, refer to Refer-
ence [24].
20. A hotel that had been extended many times, without adhering to offi-
cial safety regulations, collapsed. The death toll was approximately 300,
which is 30% of the total number of victims in the West Sumatra earth-
quake in 2009.
21. The perspective of social flux also presents a new approach to the studies
on regional conflicts. Based on the perspective of social flux, for exam-
ple, Aceh conflicts can be taken as Acehnese people’s responses to the
restrictions imposed on them to limit social flux in the region. Refer to
References [25] and [26].
assistance. In societies with high social flux, therefore,
there needs to be some arrangements to link the support-
ers and the disaster victims who have been evacuated to
places outside their original residences.
The structure called posko played an important role
in the Aceh province of Indonesia, in the wake of the
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.22 Posko is an abbreviation
for pos kordinasi, which means “coordination post” in In-
donesian. These are voluntarily organized communica-
tion posts to respond to events in Indonesia. A posko can
be organized by any organization: government, private,
domestic, or foreign. It is an ad-hoc organization for a
particular purpose and is shut down after it fulfills its pur-
pose.
Each posko is unique. The lines of command among
poskos are not fixed, and cooperation and relationships
between poskos are flexible. Hence, the posko of a district
government is not always superior to that of the village
offices.
When an assistance giver provides goods and informa-
tion to a posko, that particular posko serves as a coordina-
tor that provides goods and information to other poskos.
In this way, poskos establish flexible relationships with
one another, depending on the flow of goods and informa-
tion. In this way, poskos ensure that assistance is provided
to disaster victims who move to places beyond adminis-
trative boundaries.
2.2. Administration Villages and NGO Villages
The case of the Deah Glumpang village in Banda Aceh
city provides us an example of posko activities. The
Deah Glumpang village is a residential area located near
the coast. The percentage of residents engaged in fish-
ery, family-operated business, and the aquaculture indus-
try were approximately 40%, 30%, and 10% respectively.
Some of the remaining villagers were public servants.
These statistics are from before the tsunami attack.
Approximately 1,000 out of the 1,300 residents, in-
cluding the village headman, were killed in the tsunami
in 2004. The residents set up a posko outside the vil-
lage because there was tremendous confusion in the Deah
Glumpang village immediately after the tsunami. For dis-
tributing relief goods, students of the State Institute of Is-
lamic Studies in Aceh led the task of collecting data on
the disaster victims of the village. In February 2005, sur-
viving residents gathered in the village posko to elect a
new village headman and reported the election results to
the competent district head.
After almost all the bodies of the victims were recov-
ered, the village posko was established in March 2005.
The former headman’s son, who worked at the Public
Works Department, was stationed in the posko. When
government officials or assisting organizations visited the
posko, he showed them the list of surviving residents to
22. For detailed information on posko in Aceh, refer Reference [27].
23. Posko Satkorlak Penanggulangan Bencana Alam NAD (Coordination
Post for Disaster Management in the Aceh province) is the highest post
to respond to disasters in the Aceh Provincial Government. Note that it
is also a posko as the word posko is included in its official name.
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receive relief goods. Then, the evacuated villagers were
contacted on their mobile phones, and the relief goods
were distributed to them.
There was no building, electricity, gas, or water sup-
ply in the village when the posko was set up; yet, the
villagers decided to set up the posko in the village. The
Deah Glumpang village is located on the coast in which
all buildings were swept away by the tsunami. Therefore,
it was visited by many people who came to the tsunami-
affected sites in Banda Aceh. The village was also vis-
ited by assisting organizations, which gave relief goods.
Most importantly, the posko was set up to receive assis-
tance from the government because governmental assis-
tance was provided based only on administrative bound-
aries.
The government follows specific rules for provid-
ing assistance, whereas international organizations and
NGOs follow their own methodology for distributing re-
lief goods. Poskos were set up to coordinate assistance
from both assistance givers. Thus, tent communities or
evacuation centers with poskos functioned as “villages”
to receive assistance from NGOs, though the “villages”
were not actually “administrative villages.” Disaster vic-
tims registered themselves in administrative villages and
NGO villages, and the poskos linked them together.
2.3. Mock Tents and “Three-day Rule” in Tent Vil-
lages
Residents of the Deah Glumpang village were evacu-
ated to the Mata Ie tent village. Mata Ie is located inland
in the suburbs of Banda Aceh and belongs to the Aceh Be-
sar district. Some seven hundred tents were pitched on the
premises of the Indonesian Republic Television (TVRI)
situated on a hilltop. Here, disaster victims of the Deah
Glumpang village lived in tents together with evacuees
from other districts.
In the tent village, ration coupons were issued to each
household to avoid possible confusion in the distribution
of relief goods. Three associations coordinated the work
of the distribution system with the Students of Nature
Lovers (Mapala) in Aceh taking the lead. It was headed
by a lecturer of the Economics Department of Syiah Kuala
University, an ex-Mapala member. In the second week af-
ter the tsunami, the residents of the tent village were di-
vided into blocks ranging from A to E. The residents were
registered in these blocks by 25 students who conducted a
survey on them. By August 2005, the approximate num-
bers registered were as follows:
(i) 150 households (i.e., 700 residents) in Block A;
(ii) 125 households (i.e., 600 residents) in Block B;
(iii) 270 households (i.e., 1,200 residents) in Block C;
(iv) 140 households (i.e., 520 residents) in Block D; and
(v) 50 households (i.e., 230 residents) in Block E.
Residents of each block elected their own heads called
keucik or village headman in Acehnese language.
Relief goods from NGOs were delivered to the Mata Ie
tent village; then, they were distributed to the residents
through blocks. The residents of the Mata Ie tent village
also received relief goods from the government through
poskos set up in their original villages. Thus, by using
poskos, the residents of the tent village could receive relief
goods from both the government and NGOs.
Registering oneself in the tent village was considered a
privilege by many persons. An interesting case of a mock
tent will highlight this understanding. The Mata Ie tent
village was well known among NGOs for its nicely built
tents. Some had even put up tents that looked almost like
luxury homes with lush gardens. Trees were planted in
planters made of used tires; steps were built in front of the
tent using ground soil; and waste pipes were transformed
into handrails. It looked as if a beautiful tent contest was
taking place in the Mata Ie tent village.
Interestingly, not many of the luxurious tents were in-
habited because they were not suitably constructed or fur-
nished. Owners of these tents found them too hot at night,
and many chose to stay outside the tent village in the
homes of their relatives. They used to visit the tent vil-
lage during the day to do gardening and demonstrate their
presence in the tent village; otherwise, they feared that
their registration as residents of the tent villages would be
cancelled and they would be disqualified as recipients of
relief goods.
The Mata Ie tent village later set up a “three-day rule,”
according to which the residents of the tent village were
allowed to stay one or two nights outside the village.
However, if they stayed three nights in a row, their regis-
tration was cancelled, and they were deprived of the right
to receive rations. This rule showed that the residents of
the Mata Ie tent village considered it a privilege to receive
relief goods; therefore, they returned to their tents every
three days to retain the privilege.
2.4. Disaster Victims in Motion
The post-tsunami Acehnese society showed that disas-
ter victims who were evacuated at various places main-
tained contact with one another. They moved out if they
found a better place and made efforts to settle down rather
than stay outside temporarily and return to the tent.
Besides the disaster victims, unaffected people also
moved to better places in the aftermath of a disaster.
People from surrounding regions flocked to post-tsunami
Banda Aceh in the hope of obtaining more business op-
portunities during reconstruction. They moved into va-
cancies in the tents or temporary housings after disaster
victims had left the place. As a result, disaster victims
and unaffected people from other regions mingled in the
tent villages and temporary housings. It soon became dif-
ficult for international assistance givers to distinguish the
disaster victims from the unaffected people.
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3. Technology Transfer in High-Flux Societies
In societies with high social flux or societies with high
turnover of population, it is difficult to accumulate knowl-
edge and technology in a social circle. For example, at-
tendance at workshops and seminars in Indonesia often
drops toward the end of the sessions. People have been
very ingenuous in accumulating knowledge and technol-
ogy in social circles in high-flux societies.
Such ingenuities in transferring technology are seen in
the activities of Japanese humanitarian assistance organi-
zations, which operated after the West Sumatra (Padang)
earthquake in September 2009. There are two possible
approaches to the effective transfer of technology: by
employing international standards and by transferring the
culturally-based values and thought processes. Both in-
ternational standards and Japanese values and ways of
thought are strange to the Indonesian people, and the local
volunteers tried to “translate” the approaches into forms
acceptable to the local community.
The data described below are based on our field re-
search on seven humanitarian assistance organizations in
Padang city and Padang Pariaman district, West Sumatra,
in March 2010.24
The West Sumatra earthquake in 2009 caused over
1,000 deaths. The Indonesian Government declared the
earthquake as a national disaster and led the emergency
relief operations. Japan dispatched a search and rescue
team and an emergency medical support team. Human-
itarian assistance teams under the Japan Platform (JPF)
also provided assistance.25
3.1. Socio-Cultural Background of West Sumatra
3.1.1. Culture of Leaving Birthplaces and Absence of
Architectural Experts
The minangkabau people who form a majority in the
West Sumatra province are a matrilineal society. Lands
and houses are owned by women, and daughters inherit
from their mothers. A married couple lives in the wife’s
house. The husband-father role is not considered crucial
for men; instead, working away from home is considered
important.
In the traditional Minangkabau society, women used
to live in large and durable houses. Men used to live in
humble huts in rice fields or mountains. In the 19th cen-
tury, after the Netherlands established control over West
Sumatra, its population started growing, and a monetary
economy was introduced. These social transformations
changed the style of accommodation from traditional,
large, durable houses for joint families to modern, small,
less-durable houses for nuclear families.
The above-mentioned characteristics of the Minangk-
abau society are also evident in the earthquake-affected
areas of West Sumatra. Most young men work away from
home, but as they get older, they often come back to West
Sumatra to build houses. Nevertheless, it is not so easy to
24. For more details, refer to References [28, 29], and [30].
25. Refer to Reference [31].
find stable occupations in West Sumatra, which has min-
imum natural resources. Therefore, these men are some-
times employed to farm on other people’s fields or fish
using borrowed boats. Some men were employed for con-
struction work in villages; however, they were regarded as
temporary construction workers rather than architectural
experts because they lacked adequate specialized techni-
cal skills.
3.1.2. Abundant and Uncontrolled Water
In the Padang Pariaman district, a number of rivers flow
in parallel from the mountainous midland to the coastal
area on the west coast, and villages are formed on the
ridge paths between the rivers. In the rainy season from
September to December, heavy rains cause landslides that
obstruct vehicular traffic on the ridges. These landslides
also block the paths connecting villages with one other.
Sometimes, entire villages are engulfed by landslides.
Failure to harvest the abundant water supply forces vil-
lagers to build their houses on the ridges where there is
at least some water availability. Water scarcity causes vil-
lagers to collect rainwater in water storage tanks, which is
then used for basic household activities such as cooking,
washing, and bathing. During the dry season, villagers
need to walk several kilometers to nearby valleys to col-
lect water for domestic use.
Water scarcity is closely linked to hygiene problems. In
every household, cooking, washing, and bathing are done
in a narrow space next to a water storage tank at the back
of the house. In the dry season, all these activities have to
be performed with a limited amount of water. In the West
Sumatra earthquake, the houses did not appear to be heav-
ily damaged, but the water storage tanks were destroyed
because of which potable water was not available in many
houses.
3.2. Japanese Humanitarian Assistance Organiza-
tions in West Sumatra
Japanese assistance organizations focused their support
activities on securing hygienic water and building tech-
nologies as seen below.26
3.2.1. Assistance Organization A
Assistance Organization A donated water supply fa-
cilities to elementary and secondary schools. The water
supply facilities, installed in collaboration with local res-
idents, helped store the water piped from water sources
located at the bottom of cliffs several kilometers away.
After installing water storage facilities, the Japanese staff
of the organization endeavored to inculcate accommodat-
ing attitudes in the local staff and residents.
It is generally observed in development assistance
projects that local people do not fully understand the de-
veloper’s ideas. This results in friction between support-
ers and local residents causing the interruption of support
26. The discussion in the following section is based on the investigation re-
ports conducted by the writers of this paper. Refer to References [29, 30],
and [31].
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activities. If support activities are interrupted, humani-
tarian assistance organizations are unable to report their
developmental activities to their donors. To avoid such
problems, many assistance organizations give in to the de-
mands of local residents.
However, Assistance Organization A dared to take a
sufficiently long time to win the support of the local staff
and residents without fearing project interruptions. The
Japanese staff had rich experience in providing assistance
to projects in Indonesia and other Asian countries. These
acquired skills enabled them to take time to negotiate with
local staff and residents. First, they established good rela-
tionships with the local people, and then mobilized them
for the smooth execution of projects. An issue still to be
addressed, however, is the performance of a large number
of people in a limited time.
3.2.2. Assistance Organization B
Assistance Organization B donated toilets and trash
boxes to schools and provided materials for hygiene ed-
ucation. The assistance organizations that reconstructed
collapsed school buildings usually rebuilt only class-
rooms; other facilities including toilets were installed af-
ter the completion of the school buildings. Assistance Or-
ganization B donated toilet facilities when school build-
ings were reconstructed so that hygienic education could
be effectively conducted at school.
Assistance Organization B was based in Japan, but it
had no Japanese staff at their project sites in West Suma-
tra. The international staff was non-Japanese. They were
employed by headquarters and sent to Indonesia, whereas
the local staff members were Indonesian volunteers who
had substantial experience in providing humanitarian as-
sistance at disaster and conflict sites in Indonesia. In As-
sistance Organization B, local staff members proactively
conducted assistance activities under the supervision of
the international staff.
3.2.3. Assistance Organization C
Assistance Organization C provided technical guidance
for earthquake-resistant buildings with the cooperation of
a local staff member that they met in Yogyakarta for the
relief activities of the Java earthquake in 2006. In the
workshop, a Japanese lecturer gave a talk on earthquake-
resistant technologies, and an Indonesian lecturer ex-
plained the details. A combination of Japanese and In-
donesian lecturers enabled Japanese earthquake-resistant
technologies to be transferred to Indonesia to suit the local
communities.
3.2.4. Assistance Organization D
Assistance Organization D constructed halls, which
served as offices for the heads of the branch villages,
and Assistance Organization D provided the materials re-
quired to make these village halls functional.
Assistance Organization D introduced the design and
construction of village halls, which were intended to
demonstrate Japanese building technologies. However,
once the village halls were handed over to the local res-
idents, the residents started to use the hall in many other
ways. Halls were used as information booths, and some
halls were changed into coffee shops.
Transforming the village halls into coffee shops could
be perceived as an economic pursuit; however, in theWest
Sumatran culture, coffee shops function as places for the
exchange of information. By tacitly approving the modi-
fication of the use of the village halls, Assistance Organi-
zation D responded ingenuously to the high social flux.
3.3. Domestic Volunteers as Coordinators for Tech-
nology Transfer
Domestic volunteers who participated in the assistance
project conducted by Japanese assistance organizations
played the role of “translating” knowledge and technolo-
gies into forms that are locally acceptable and understand-
able.
The role of domestic volunteers in Indonesia emerged
after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. International hu-
manitarian assistance organizations required local NGOs
to serve as their counterparts in providing emergency hu-
manitarian assistance. Volunteers who had participated
in the projects of foreign NGOs (in conflict areas such as
East Timor and disaster-affected areas such as Aceh) were
supposed to share and accumulate the acquired knowl-
edge and skills. These could then be used for projects
in other areas of disaster or conflicts. Thus, the domestic
volunteers became mediators in the transfer of knowledge
and technology.
4. Transmission of Information in High-Flux
Societies
Disaster victims experience sudden and drastic changes
in their worldview. They need information on what, how,
and why such incidents are caused. People who have not
suffered direct damages also require information to grasp
the extent and scale of the disaster for the rescue and re-
construction of victims.
This section describes practices used to transmit and
share information on the Java (Bantul) earthquakes of
May 2006.27 We interviewed the personnel of three NGOs
in Yogyakarta city and Bantul district in August 2008.
Bantul district in the Yogyakarta province suffered the
heaviest damage, whereas Yogyakarta city, which is the
provincial capital and an important urban area in the Yo-
gyakarta province, suffered only slight damage. Three
local NGOs based in Yogyakarta city issued community
papers in an attempt to transmit and share information on
the damage caused and the rescue and reconstruction op-
erations.
4.1. Disaster-Affected Society in Java
The Yogyakarta province and parts of the Central Java
province, located within a radius of 50 km of the epicen-
27. Refer to the discussions in Reference [32].
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ter, were devastated. The death toll was over 5,000 in
the Java earthquake. Two rural districts, Bantul district in
the Yogyakarta province and Klaten district in the Central
Java province, suffered the heaviest damages.
Yogyakarta city is a premier international tourist city
in Java; it has world heritage monuments such as the
Borobudur ruins and Prambanan temples. Yogyakarata
city is also known as an educational city with prestigious
universities such as GajahMada University. The city has a
royal palace where the sultan assumes the hereditary gov-
ernorship of the Yogyakarta province and functions sim-
ilar to an elected administrative chief. Yogyakarta city
functions as the center of Javanese culture, which is sym-
bolized by traditional interpersonal relationships.
In the densely populated rural areas around Yogyakarta
city, local communities organize rumah tetangga (RT) or
neighborhood associations to provide substantial mutual
aid. They are also closely linked with extra-regional ar-
eas of Yogyakarta city (within commuting distance) and
Jakarta, the metropolis in Java Island (where mutual-aid
societies of compatriots are organized). The men also go
overseas for jobs.
For the Javanese in hinterland rural areas, Yogyakarta
city serves as the center of Javanese culture and the con-
tact point for extra-regional areas.
4.2. Natural Disasters and Information
Information is one of the most important requirements
at disaster sites; however, increasing the information out-
put alone would not be enough. It is also important to
ensure the authenticity of information, which is secured
by its sources and communication routes. Because the
Indian Ocean tsunami was still vivid in the minds of the
people, some residents evacuated to the hills after the Java
earthquake of 2006 to protect themselves from any fu-
ture tsunamis. Some persons tried to evacuate from the
base of the mountain to the coastal areas in the belief that
the earthquake was caused by the eruption of Mount Mer-
api in the suburbs of the Yogyakarta province. Therefore,
traffic snarls occurred at the intersection of bidirectional
vehicular movement.
People in the disaster sites had difficulty collecting in-
formation for about a week after the Bantul earthquake.
It was not customary to subscribe to newspapers. News-
papers were mainly subscribed by the residents of Yo-
gyakarta city. In the suburban areas, newspapers were
posted on the bulletin boards of mosques or sold on the
streets. For the daily news, people usually tune in to
the TV or the radio. However, TV broadcasting services
were unavailable for ten days after the earthquake because
of power failure. People could receive radio broadcasts
via battery-operated radio sets; however, this facility was
limited because there was a steep hike in battery prices.
Hence, for some period after the earthquake, they received
indirect information mainly from either market billboards
or people who received handbills from NGOs.
4.3. Local NGOs and Transmission of Information
Local NGOs based in Yogyakarta city published com-
munity papers in an effort to share information with the
rural disaster sites. Such community papers are Saksi
Gempa (Witness of Earthquakes), Suara Korban Bencana
(Voices of Disaster Victims), and Merti Jogja (Guardian
of Jogjakarta).
Local NGOs issued community papers because “na-
tional newspapers mainly carry the views of politicians or
government officials at Jakarta and little space is provided
for the voices of public including disaster victims.”28
Community papers were intended to connect assistance
givers and disaster victims besides helping disaster vic-
tims connect among themselves. These papers were pre-
pared for publication for three months; subsequent publi-
cations were to depend on the need for such papers and
the availability of funds.
4.3.1. Saksi Gempa (Witness of Earthquakes)
Saksi Gempa or Witness of Earthquakes was published
by a local NGO named Combine that specialized in in-
formation management. Before the earthquake struck
the area, Combine had launched a website called Merapi
Net29 to post short messages on the web bulletin board by
using mobile phones in preparation for the possible erup-
tions of Mount Merapi. In the wake of the earthquake,
they launched a website Saksi Gempa30 to provide infor-
mation on damages and rehabilitation assistance, such as
the prices of building materials. Combine published a
community paper titled Saksi Gempa to convey the situa-
tion of disaster sites to the government organizations and
domestic and international NGOs.
Saksi Gempa, which was started on June 3, 2006, was
published twice a week on four A5-size sheets of pa-
per. This practice was followed for the first month from
the first issue to the seventh issue. From the eighth is-
sue onward, it was published three times a week on four
A4-size pages. About 1,500 copies were printed, 300
to 500 copies of which were distributed through NGOs.
The community paper was also available from the Saksi
Gempa website.
The paper reported the details regarding the persons
and organizations that were involved in different kinds
of rescue operations. In response to the needs of disas-
ter victims received as short messages sent from mobile
phones, the paper carried articles on how disaster victims
could take loans from banks.” Saksi Gempa drew some
complaints from NGOs when it published a list of mo-
bile numbers of the persons in charge of local and interna-
tional NGOs. However, the paper justified its position by
arguing that posting the list would enhance transparency
of the NGO activities.
The publishers of Saksi Gempa said, “Foreign NGOs
are reliable as long as they understand the Javanese cul-
ture through their past activities in Java. For other NGOs,
28. From the interview with Mr. Prim Nugroho on August 16, 2006.
29. Retrieved from http://merapi.combine.or.id/ on July 31, 2011.
30. Retrieved from http://www.saksigempa.org/ on October 15, 2009.
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Fig. 1. Pages 1 and 3 of the first issue of Saksi Gempa.
we cannot say that they should not conduct assistance
projects here, but we have to report their activities in our
papers to enhance transparency as well as to inform peo-
ple of their reliability.” The paper also specified that extra-
regional NGOs should not rush into relief activities; in-
stead, they should open local offices first and commence
their assistance activities only after they have fully under-
stood the Javanese society and culture.
4.3.2. Suara Korban Bencana (Voices of Disaster Vic-
tims)
Twenty-six local NGOs developed the forum of Suara
Korban Bencana on May 29, 2006. Key participants of
the forum were Cindelaras, Combine, and Institute for
Research and Empowerment (IRE). By August 2006, the
number of participating NGOs grew to 69 organizations.
The forum first published the community paper Suara Ko-
rban Bencana (Voices of Disaster Victims) on June 20,
2006. The paper was published weekly on eight A4-size
pages. Ten thousand copies were circulated through par-
ticipating NGOs, mobile clinic services, and street gaso-
line stands. The paper was also available on the website
of the forum.31
The editorial policy of Suara Korban Bencanawas that
any views or opinions that would encourage disaster vic-
tims should be given priority over governmental state-
ments or voices of NGOs. Heartening news included in-
cidents about victims who performed small acts of mercy
– farmers who resumed farming soon after the earth-
quake even though their houses had completely collapsed;
bamboo merchants who carried on business at unchanged
prices even with increasing demand for bamboo; and dis-
aster victims sharing their sparse resources with other dis-
aster victims. The paper also carried cartoons for increas-
ing its acceptability among readers. The paper clarified
its publication preferences in colophons that stated, “the
editors will cordially welcome short messages, articles,
photographs, pictures, data, and any other forms of in-
formation concerning the earthquake disaster victims, but
not instant noodles.”
31. Retrieved from http://www.suarakorbanbencana.org/ on October 15,
2009.
Fig. 2. Pages 1 and 8 of No. 2 issue of Suara Korban Bencana.
4.3.3. Merti Jogja (Guardian of Jogjakarta)
Local NGO activists organized a forum in the first week
of June 2006 and published a community paper Merti
Jogja (Guardian of Jogjakarta) on the earthquake and re-
lief operations on June 23, 2006. The paper did not carry
any advertisements and was distributed free of cost. Two
thousand copies of this eight-page paper were first pub-
lished weekly on A3-size pages. Subsequently, 1,000
copies were published biweekly.
The editors were Mr. Prim Nugroho and the staff of
Humana, a local NGO that used Prim Nugroho’s house as
their office. The paper was distributed to readers through
related NGOs. The paper used a large typeface to ensure
easy readability when pasted on walls.
Merti Jogja was designed to be read by farmers in Ja-
vanese villages. The paper contained pictures of charac-
ters in wayang or puppet shadow plays that are popular
in Javanese villages. It contained the autography of for-
mer Indonesian President Sukarno and photographs of the
former sultan of Yogyakarta. It also provided children’s
“illustrated diaries” and “what if I am . . . ” columns to en-
courage readers to contribute to the paper. Many Javanese
words were inserted within the Indonesian text because
people felt more comfortable with the Javanese language
than the national Indonesian language.
Local NGOs based in Yogyakarta city organized fo-
rums and published community papers to share informa-
tion with the disaster victims in the heavily devastated
suburban rural areas. Such activities were launched be-
cause relief activities on the national level or by foreign
organizations did not always meet the expectations of lo-
cal residents. Additionally, the existing national media
was not always able to satisfactorily report local events.
4.4. Community Papers as Information Intermedi-
aries
In responding to disasters, central governments and in-
ternational humanitarian assistance organizations worked
out programs for relief and reconstruction operations
based on their understanding of the disaster. Meanwhile,
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the disaster-affected people tried to deal with the recon-
struction operations based on their own perceptions of re-
ality. As a result, some residents in the disaster sites came
up as intermediaries to modify the information received
from the central government and external societies to suit
the conditions of the disaster-affected people.
Because the practice of assisting disaster victims is in-
creasing in popularity worldwide, disaster-affected com-
munities are being directly exposed to assistance activi-
ties by international agencies. Local NGOs based in Yo-
gyakarta city also tried to establish grassroots-level con-
tacts to manage local reconstruction activities.
Local NGOs, which published community papers, at-
tempted to modify the information received from the
Central Government and international humanitarian assis-
tance organizations to suit the realities of disaster sites be-
fore transmitting them to local communities. In societies
with high social flux, however, information “translated”
by local NGOs does not always conform to the realities of
disaster sites. In that sense, community papers will need
to further investigate how such transmitted information is
accepted and utilized. This will be taken up in our future
research study.
5. Conclusion: Indonesian Model for Disaster
Management and Reconstruction
From the new perspective of social flux, we reviewed
how information and technology are transmitted and
shared for disaster management and humanitarian assis-
tance in Indonesia. Taking the new aspect of social flux
positively, we argued that poskos, domestic volunteers,
community papers, and other ingenuousmethods were ef-
fectively used in distributing relief goods and sharing in-
formation. This positive evaluation of the Indonesian way
of responding to natural disasters may be validated by as-
suming that the knowledge and experiences of one social
circle need not necessarily be acceptable in other circles.
Proposing specific measures for disaster management
and reconstruction are beyond the scope of this paper.
However, the concept of high social flux and the ingenu-
ous methods of transferring knowledge and experiences in
high-flux societies present a new perspective for disaster
management, humanitarian support, and reconstruction
activities. This would prove useful for disaster manage-
ment and reconstruction measures in Indonesia and other
countries, especially along the coast of the Indian Ocean,
where the social structure is similar to that of Indonesia.32
32. Reference [33] refers to the reexamination based on the high mobility of
housings in response to disasters in Japanese society.
Fig. 3. Pages 1 and 7 of No. 4 issue ofMerti Jogja.
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